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AbstrAct
Coeval philosophical texts provide no information about the extent to which the Ancient 
World practiced vegetarianism or about its concrete aspects. However, they offer a rich array 
of the arguments used to both justify and promote it. The present paper will focus on the four 
main philosophical arguments in favor of vegetarianism. These arguments were proposed and 
revised by various authors. The four arguments that will be studied are: the ascetic-religious 
one, mainly used by the Orphic tradition and then taken up by various authors, especially the 
Pythagoreans; the one based on the biopsychological affinity of all living beings, and coher-
ently promoted by Theophrastus; the one based on the dignity and value of the animal world, 
widely developed especially by Plutarch; and finally the one, central to Porphyry’s treatise, 
that relates abstinence from meat to the need of the soul to elevate itself to the divine and be 
purified of any element linking it to the body.
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1. the four mAin Arguments in fAvor of vegetAriAnism
 in the Ancient philosophy
Coeval philosophical texts provide no information about the extent to 
which the Ancient World practiced vegetarianism or about its concrete 
aspects. However, they offer a rich array of the arguments used to both 
justify and promote it (Haussleiter 1935). The present paper will focus on 
the four main philosophical arguments in favor of vegetarianism. These 
arguments were proposed and revised by various authors, sometimes 
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together or linked to others (e.g. the difficult preparation and digestibility 
of meat), especially by Porphyry in his On Abstinence from Killing Animals 
(De abstinentia) – probably written after 270 CE (Bouffartigue and Patillon 
1977, XVIII-XIX). Thanks to its ample documentation, Porphyry’s treatise 
represents the most important ancient philosophical source on this topic. 
The four arguments that will be studied are: the ascetic-religious one, 
mainly used by the Orphic tradition and then taken up by various authors 
(Pre-Socratic and not), especially the Pythagoreans; the one based on the 
biopsychological affinity of all living beings, and coherently promoted by 
Theophrastus; the one based on the dignity and value of the animal world, 
widely developed especially by Plutarch; and finally the one, central to 
Porphyry’s treatise, that relates abstinence from meat (a food difficult to 
obtain, prepare and digest, and thus having a negative effect on body and 
mind) to the need of the soul to elevate itself to the divine and be purified 
of any element linking it to the body.
2. orphism And pre-socrAtic thinkers
From its very origins, vegetarianism has been an option that goes beyond 
the mere selection of a menu, able to embrace the manifold meanings (sym-
bolic and not) of food. Indeed, it has brought into question the lifestyle 
and behaviors promoted by the societies of which it was a part; moreover, 
it also seems to have been linked with the refusal of the sacrificial prac-
tices of official religion and with the special position attributed to humans 
in the great chain of being. Its first appearance in archaic Greece seems 
to have been connected with Orphism (VI century BCE), a religious ref-
ormation movement that had significant and well-known philosophical 
consequences. Without radically rejecting traditional polytheism, Orphism 
condemned one of its fundamental rituals, abhorring the bloodshed on the 
altars of the gods. In so doing, Orphism introduced a new set of beliefs and 
above all a new interpretation of human existence into Greek civilization 
(Pugliese Carratelli 2001; Bernabé and Cristobal 2007).
The basis of Orphism was the affirmation of a clear anthropological 
dualism: the human soul, of divine origin and thus immortal and incorrupt-
ible, was condemned to be united with a mortal and corruptible body in 
order to expiate an obscure guilt, being reincarnated in successive bodily 
existences (not only in human forms but also in animals). Therefore, the 
soul aspired to be released from its corporeal confinement and from the 
reincarnation cycle in order to be reunited with the divine. This could be 
obtained through purifications, rituals and a lifestyle based on abstinence 
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from any material reality, above all from the consumption of meat, consid-
ered able to bind the soul to the body. Meat-eating was also prohibited for 
another reason: the idea of the transmigration of souls into animals sug-
gested that it was possible to kill and eat the body of a being into which the 
soul of a friend or relative had entered. 
Therefore, abstinence from meat was a characteristic feature of the 
Orphic lifestyle, as Plato stated several centuries later: 
Some say it [body] is the tomb (soma) of the soul, their notion being that 
the soul is buried in the present life […]. But I think it most likely that the 
Orphic poets gave this name, with the idea that the soul is undergoing pun-
ishment for something; they think it has the body as an enclosure to keep it 
safe, like a prison, and this is, as the name itself denotes, the safe (soma) for 
the soul, until the penalty is paid. (Plato, Cratylus, 400b-c)  1
Later, several Pre-Socratic thinkers shared the ban on killing and eating 
animals with Orphism. According to Porphyry (233/234-305 CE) and 
Iamblichus (ca. 250 - ca. 325 CE), this ban was adopted by Pythagoras of 
Samos (ca. 570 - ca. 490 BCE) and the community he founded (Porphyry, 
Vie de Pythagore, Lettre à Marcella, 34-9, and Iamblichus, On the Pythago-
rean Life, XXI, 98-100)  2. From its beginning, this community was char-
acterized by an interest in the mathematical sciences and by the triumph 
of the collective spirit over the individual element. This last point makes 
it difficult to distinguish Pythagoras’ contribution from that of his follow-
ers and affiliates, “the so-called Pythagoreans” (Aristotle, The Metaphys-
ics, I, 5, 985b 23-4)  3. According to Porphyry (Vie de Pythagore, Lettre à 
Marcella, 19), Pythagoras was the first to introduce to Greece the doctrine 
that the human soul is immortal and transmigrates into other species of 
living beings, as well as the doctrine of the affinity of all living creatures. 
These teachings gave rise to rules of purification and abstinence (including 
abstinence from meat-eating) aimed at purifying the body and rendering it 
submissive to the soul. However, although it shared the idea of vegetarian-
 1 Cf. also Plato, Laws, VI, 782c-d: “The custom of men sacrificing one another is, in 
fact, one that survives even now among many peoples; whereas amongst others we hear 
of how the opposite custom existed, when they were forbidden so much as to eat an ox, 
and their offerings to the gods consisted, not of animals, but of cakes of meal and grain 
steeped in honey, and other such bloodless sacrifices, and from flesh they abstained as 
though it were unholy to eat it or to stain with blood the altars of the gods; instead of that, 
those of us men who then existed lived what is called an Orphic life, keeping wholly to 
inanimate food and, contrariwise, abstaining wholly from things animate”.
 2 In Republic, X, 600b 2-5 Plato explicitly praises Pythagoras’ contribution to the 
formulation of the “pythagorean way of life”.
 3 On the question of the creation, development, nature and downfall of the Pythago-
rean community see Boudouris 1992, 49-69.
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ism with Orphism, we cannot characterize Pythagoreanism as a mystery 
religion or as a movement rivaling the traditional religious beliefs of the 
Greeks. In contrast with Orphism (some of whose theses it reformed, 
merging them with philosophy), Pythagoreanism related the liberation 
of man from the reincarnation cycle not to celebrations or religious rites 
but to the practice of mathematical sciences, considered the most effective 
instrument of purification and thus cultivated as a means and not an end.
The ban on the killing and eating of animals was also proposed by 
another Pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles (ca. 485 - ca. 432 BCE) in 
his Purifications (Katharmoi), a work close to the magical-sacred tradition 
of Pythagoreanism and devoted to the purification of the soul. Here again, 
his position was based on the belief that the soul, understood as a fallen 
spirit, experiences successive reincarnations (DK 31 B 117) and after a 
long and difficult itinerary of purification can be freed of all evils caused 
by its connection with the body. This itinerary includes a number of dietary 
prescriptions as well as condemnation of the killing of any living being, 
especially when related to religious sacrifices (DK 31 B 128 and 136). 
According to Sextus Empiricus (ca. 160 - ca. 210 CE), both Pythagoras 
and Empedocles believed that a single spirit, widespread throughout the 
universe, establishes some sort of fellowship not only among humans and 
between humans and gods, but also between humans and animals. There-
fore, if animals are man’s fellows, to kill them and eat their flesh is an unjust 
and impious act. As he clearly affirmed: 
Pythagoras and Empedocles and the rest of the Italian company declare that 
we have some fellowship (koinonian) not only with one another and with the 
Gods but also with the irrational animals. For there is one spirit (pneuma) 
which pervades, like a soul (psyches), the whole Universe, and which also 
makes us one with them. Wherefore if we slay them and feed on their flesh 
we shall be doing what is unjust and impious, as destroying our kindred. 
Hence, too, these philosophers advised abstinence from animal (ton empsy-
chon) food, and declared that those men were impious ‘Redden’d the Blessed 
Ones’ altars with warm blood pouring from victims. (Sextus Empiricus, 
Against the Physicists, I, 127)
3. theophrAstus
The justification of vegetarianism and rejection of cruel sacrifices by Theo-
phrastus (371-287 BCE) is different, according to the fragments of his Peri 
eusebeias transcribed in Porphyry’s On Abstinence from Killing Animals. 
Although he was Aristotle’s successor at the Lyceum, Theophrastus did not 
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accept his teacher’s hierarchical and anthropocentric view of living beings 
based on the idea that man was at the apex of the phenomenal world since 
“man alone of the animals possesses speech [logon de monon anthropos 
echei ton zoon]” (Aristotle, Politics, I, 2, 1253a 9-10). On the contrary, 
Theophrastus believed that there is a biopsychological affinity (oikeiotes) 
not only among all human beings but also between them and animals and 
thus it is necessary to treat the latter with pietas (Dierauer 1977). Humans 
and animals belong to the same community, being of the same race (sug-
gheneis); they share both the principles of their bodies and the fact of being 
alive, along with what that entails: appetites, movements of the soul related 
to sensation, reasonings (loghismoi) (On Abstinence from Killing Animals, 
III, 25, 1-3 = Peri eus. fr. 4 Bernays). 
This is the basis of Theophrastus’ strong sense of the value of animal 
life and his belief that, just as the existence of wicked men who harm other 
men does not negate the affinity among human beings, the existence of 
instinctively ferocious, and thus harmful, animals does not negate the affin-
ity between humans and harmless animals. In other words, the relationship 
between humans and animals, like that among humans, must be rooted 
in justice. Therefore, just as it is appropriate to kill a man who behaves 
unjustly, it is legitimate to kill an animal that instinctively attacks  4, and 
likewise, as it is necessary to behave fairly with fair humans, it is right and 
proper to be fair with harmless animals (On Abstinence from Killing Ani-
mals, II, 22, 1-2 = Peri eus. fr. 4 Bernays). 
To Theophrastus it is precisely this “juridical equality” between 
humans and animals that renders ritual sacrifices impious towards the gods 
(as well as unjust towards animals), and he emphasizes that the value of 
such sacrifices is not absolute but linked to precise historical contingencies. 
He identifies two distinct phases in human history. During the first, gov-
erned by Aphrodite, goddess of love and fertility, humans lived in peace 
among themselves and with all living beings; they had total respect for all 
forms of life because they perceived their affinity with the other animals 
and this was reflected in their offerings to the goddess, consisting of part of 
their harvests and of sober libations. During the second phase, governed by 
Ares, god of war, conflict prevailed in the relationships among humans but 
also in those with the other living beings. Once human customs had been 
corrupted by the habit of shedding blood, it became usual and legitimate 
to practice cruel sacrifices in honor of the gods, thus breaching the bond 
 4 The legitimacy of killing only animals harmful by nature was argued earlier by 
Democritus (ca. 460 - ca. 380 BCE), DK 68 B 257.
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of friendship (philia) that was to embrace all living beings (On Abstinence 
from Killing Animals, II, 21, 1-3; 22, 1-3). 
Therefore, Theophrastus presents a new way of understanding man’s 
place within reality and the need to reform the traditional religious customs 
through the abolition of cruel sacrifices. However, the motivations are bio-
logical rather than ethical-religious. Theophrastus’ general stance in regard 
to the human-animal relationship, based on their affinity, leads him to 
affirm the insuppressible nature of the primary right to life and to maintain, 
on ethical-juridical grounds, the existence of a relationship of continuity 
between humans and animals (Battegazzore 1996, 81-93).
4. plutArch’s “de esu cArnium”
Moralia by Plutarch (46/50 - after 120 CE) includes three essays about ani-
mals – On the Eating of Flesh (De esu carnium), Beasts Are Rational (Bruta 
animalia ratione uti), Whether Land or Sea Animals Are Cleverer (De sol-
lertia animalium) – in which vegetarianism is proposed as part of a cogent 
discussion of the dignity and manifold qualities of animals. As usual, Plu-
tarch’s polemic is directed mainly towards the Stoics and their belief in the 
supremacy of man as the only possessor of rational thought. 
In De esu carnium, composed of two brief conferences (logoi) part of 
whose text is now missing, the illegitimacy of meat-eating is based on two 
precise arguments. The first concerns the unnaturalness of the consump-
tion of meat, shown by the fact that the human body lacks those anatomical 
parts that permit carnivorous animals to attack and eat their prey: 
It is absurd […] to say that the practice of flesh-eating is based on Nature. For 
that man is not naturally carnivorous is, in the first place, obvious from the 
structure of his body. A man’s frame is in no way similar to those creatures who 
were made for flesh-eating: he has no hooked beak or sharp nails or jagged 
teeth, no strong stomach or warmth of vital fluids able to digest and assimilate 
a heavy diet of flesh. (Plutarch, On the Eating of Flesh, I, 994 F - 995 A)
Plutarch explains that meat-eating could be justified in early times when 
agricultural techniques had not been introduced and humans had not 
learnt to use all the resources offered by nature. However, it cannot be jus-
tified today now that all these techniques have been acquired; thus meat-
eating is a perverse human tendency to satisfy unnatural and false tastes. As 
Plutarch affirms: 
You who live now, what madness, what frenzy drives you to the pollution of 
shedding blood, you who have such a superfluity of necessities? Why slander 
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the earth by implying that she cannot support you? Why impiously offend 
law-giving Demeter and bring shame upon Dionysus, lord of the cultivated 
vine, the gracious one, as if you did not receive enough from their hands? 
Are you not ashamed to mingle domestic crops with blood and gore? (Plu-
tarch, On the Eating of Flesh, I, 994 A-B)
Finally, he observes the negative effects of this diet on both the human 
body, which fills with unhealthy humors, and the mind, which is unduly 
weighed down: “the eating of flesh is not only physically against nature, but 
it also makes us spiritually coarse and gross by reason of satiety and surfeit” 
(Plutarch, On the Eating of Flesh, I, 995 D-E).
The second argument is based on the injustice of killing animals, an act 
that violates their natural innocence and elegance, inflicting on them ter-
rible suffering merely for the sake of gluttony, as clearly expressed by the 
examples provided in the text (On the Eating of Flesh, II, 996 E - 997 A). 
Their voices, he explains, are not inarticulate sounds but rather prayers and 
pleadings for justice. Hence killing animals is contrary to every principle 
of humanity. From a philosophical standpoint, vegetarianism appears as a 
nobler attitude than its counterpart: 
Nothing abashed us, not the flower-like tinting of the flesh, not the persua-
siveness of the harmonious voice, not the cleanliness of their habits or the 
unusual intelligence that may be found in the poor wretches. No, for the sake 
of a little flesh we deprive them of sun, of light, of the duration of life to 
which they are entitled by birth and being. Then we go on to assume that 
when they utter cries and squeaks their speech is inarticulate, that they do 
not, begging for mercy, entreating, seeking justice […]. Do but consider 
which are the philosophers who serve the better to humanize us: those who 
bid us eat our children and friends and fathers and wives after their death  5, 
or Pythagoras and Empedocles who try to accustom us to act justly toward 
other creatures also? (Plutarch, On the Eating of Flesh, I, 994 D-E; II, 997 E)
Moreover, harking back to the Orphic-Pythagorean tradition, Plutarch 
recalls the doctrine of transmigration of souls into other forms of life and 
thus the possibility that by eating meat one might actually risk feeding on 
the body of a loved one. Although he believes this doctrine to be insuf-
ficiently demonstrated, the very doubt that it might be true should suggest 
abstinence from meat-eating: “yet even if the argument of the migration 
of souls from body to body is not demonstrated to the point of complete 
belief, there is enough doubt to make us quite cautious and fearful” (Plu-
tarch, On the Eating of Flesh, II, 998 C-D).
 5 The reference is to the ancient Stoics, in particular Chrysippus who undoubtedly 
advised that form of anthropophagy; cf. Ioannes ab Arnim 1979, III, 186-7.
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5. plutArch’s “brutA AnimAliA rAtione uti”
 And “de sollertiA AnimAlium”
In Plutarch’s other two essays devoted to animals, vegetarianism is 
addressed in a less direct manner. However, by amply illustrating the 
natural abilities of animals, these works also highlight the unreasonable-
ness and injustice of meat-eating and thus argue for its abolition. In Bruta 
animalia ratione uti (a dialogue among several speakers influenced by the 
expressive manner of the Cynic school and in strong philosophical dispute 
with Stoicism), Plutarch clearly affirms that the comparison in terms of 
virtues between humans and animals demonstrates the superiority of the 
latter: indeed, animals are naturally endowed with virtues while human 
beings gradually acquire them or are forced to do so. This is the case, for 
instance, of courage, temperance and, more generally, the ability to limit 
themselves to satisfaction of natural, necessary desires and pleasures, and 
to act with moderation in response to natural but unnecessary ones (Beasts 
Are Rational, 989 F). 
With particular regard to the desires related to eating and drinking, 
the moderation of animals with respect to humans is shown by the fact 
that each species, following nature, eats only one type of food whereas man 
“in his pleasures is led astray by gluttony to everything edible; he tries and 
tastes everything as if he had not yet come to recognize what is suitable and 
proper for him; alone of all creatures he is omnivorous” (Plutarch, Beasts 
Are Rational, 991 B-C). Here Plutarch returns to and clarifies the consid-
erations in De esu carnium concerning the unnatural nature of a diet based 
on animal flesh. Such a diet does not derive from a real need or the lack of 
more suitable foods but merely from vice and satiety which compel humans 
to seek new unnecessary foods. This is a recurrent theme in Plutarch’s writ-
ings on animals: that meat is an appetizer (opson), capable of producing – 
and this is the new element introduced here – impurity in man since it is 
derived from the killing of a living being: 
His [of man] eating of flesh is caused by no lack of means or methods, for 
he can always in season harvest and garner and gather in such a succession 
of plants and grains as will all but tire him out with their abundance; but 
driven on by luxurious desires and satiety with merely essential nourishment, 
he pursues illicit food, made unclean by the slaughter of beasts; and he does 
this in a much more cruel way than the most savage beasts of prey. Blood 
and gore and raw flesh are the proper diet of kite and wolf and snake; to man 
they are an appetizer (opson). (Plutarch, Beasts Are Rational, 991 C-D)
Finally, in De sollertia animalium, a lively dialogue in two parts devoted 
to the question of whether land or sea animals are cleverer, vegetarianism 
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is presented as the better option on the basis of the recognition in animals 
of memory, emotions and passions, but also of a form of rationality (“all 
animals partake in one way or another of reason and understanding”). This 
thesis is advanced by two of the speakers, Aristotimus and Phaedimus, who 
provide a broad and concrete array of examples (Whether Land or Sea Ani-
mals Are Cleverer, 966 B - 985 B). 
Reasoning in animals is undoubtedly less perfect than in humans, 
although the difference is merely in degree, like that observed for other 
characteristics much more developed in the animals (e.g. speed, strength, 
sight and hearing). As Plutarch states: 
Mere reason is implanted by nature, but real and perfect reason is the prod-
uct of care and education. And this is why every living creature has the fac-
ulty of reasoning; but if what they seek is true reason and wisdom, not even 
man may be said to possess it. For as one capacity for seeing or flying differs 
from another (hawks and cicadas do not see alike, nor do eagles and par-
tridges fly alike), so also not every reasoning creature has in the same way a 
mental dexterity or acumen that has attained perfection. (Plutarch, Whether 
Land or Sea Animals Are Cleverer, 960 A; cf. also 962 C)
From this it follows that human behavior towards animals, beings also 
endowed with reason, should not entail, as often happens, utilitarian 
exploitation or, even worse, cruelty and injustice. Reproposing a thesis 
advanced earlier by Theophrastus, another speaker named Autobulus 
declares that it is necessary to apply a criterion of justice in the relation-
ship with the animals. Meek animals, whose collaboration can facilitate the 
necessities of life, should be treated humanely whereas it is legitimate to kill 
those that are harmful and dangerous: 
There is no injustice, surely, in punishing and slaying animals that are anti-
social and merely injurious, while taming those that are gentle and friendly 
to man and making them our helpers in the tasks for which they are severally 
fitted by nature. (Plutarch, Whether Land or Sea Animals Are Cleverer, 964 F)
Another consequence of the preceding affirmations is the need to ban all 
those practices or activities that cause pain or violent death to animals not 
harmful to man, such as meat-eating, cruel spectacles of the arena, hunting 
and fishing: 
For living is not abolished nor life terminated when a man has no more plat-
ters of fish or pâté de foie gras or mincemeat of beef or kids’ flesh for his 
banquets – or when he no longer, idling in the theatre or hunting for sport, 
compels some beasts against their will to stand their ground and fight, while 
he destroys others which have not the instinct to fight back even in their own 
defence. For I think sport should be joyful and between playmates who are 
merry on both sides […]. Just so, in hunting and fishing, men amuse them-
Letterio Mauro
22
Relations – 5.1 - June 2017
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
selves with the suffering and death of animals, even tearing some of them 
piteously from their cubs and nestlings. The fact is that it is not those who 
make use of animals who do them wrong, but those who use them harmfully 
and heedlessly and in cruel ways. (Plutarch, Whether Land or Sea Animals 
Are Cleverer, 965 A-B)
6. porphyry
Porphyry’s treatise On Abstinence from Killing Animals is divided into four 
books and is written as an open letter to his friend Firmus Castricius who, 
after initially embracing vegetarianism, had abandoned that lifestyle and 
had “reverted to consuming flesh” (I, 1, 1). Porphyry sought to lead his 
friend back to vegetarianism, believing it to be essential to an authentic 
philosophical life: “an inanimate, simple diet, available to all, takes these 
[evils: a condition of somnolence, intensity and frequency of illness, provo-
cation of sexual desire, thicker exhalations, heavy chains] away from us, 
offering peace for the reasoning power which provides us with security” 
(On Abstinence from Killing Animals, I, 47, 2). Indeed temperance permits 
him who is truly philosophical and thus considers the rational soul to be 
his real self, despising material pleasures, to approach the god in purity of 
body and soul. 
However, vegetarianism is more than just a sober and virtuous diet. 
Unlike plants, animals cannot be used as food unless they are killed (since 
humans do not eat animals that have died of old age or disease) and this 
represents a fundamental problem to Porphyry: do animals differ so much 
from man as to justify his killing them?
Rejecting the idea, held mainly by the Stoics, that animals lack reason 
(logos), and thus are extraneous to the human (and divine) community and 
to the possibility of being treated according to common criteria of justice 
(On Abstinence from Killing Animals, I, 4, 1-2), Porphyry argues instead 
that animals are fundamentally similar to humans. Reporting extracts from 
works by other authors (including Theophrastus and Plutarch) he points 
out that the bodies of animals consist of the same elements as human 
bodies and that their physical and emotional responses, like those of 
humans, possess a recognizable meaning. Moreover, they are able to com-
municate with each other through species-specific languages (humans are 
unable to understand these languages just as they do not understand those 
different from their own, as Porphyry explains by means of many examples 
in On Abstinence from Killing Animals, III, 3-4) and to a certain extent 
with humans; this is shown by the fact that 
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Whether the humans are angry or friendly or calling, whether the voice is 
hunting or wanting something or giving something, in short, whatever it 
is doing: to every one they respond appropriately. They could not do this 
unless like worked upon like in understanding. (Porphyry, On Abstinence 
from Killing Animals, III, 6, 1)
Above all, however, animals appear to be aware of the situations in which 
they find themselves from time to time, they predict future situations, they 
show practical wisdom and the ability to remember and learn (On Absti-
nence from Killing Animals, III, 7-15). These behaviors are testaments to 
the presence in them of logos, even if, as previously mentioned, in a form 
different from humans, so that it must be admitted 
That the difference is a matter of more and less, not of complete deprivation, 
nor of a have and a have-not. […] So, even if we think more than they do, 
animals are not to be deprived of thinking, any more than partridges are to 
be deprived of flying because falcons fly more, or indeed falcons because the 
goshawk flies more than they and all other birds do. (Porphyry, On Absti-
nence from Killing Animals, III, 8, 7-8)  6
Porphyry proposes these ideas in the various books of his On Abstinence 
from Killing Animals, albeit not always in a systematic way: “his argu-
ments are cumulative rather than sequential” (Porphyry 2000, 13). How-
ever, thanks to the broad nature of his argumentation, drawing on vari-
ous sources and traditions  7, it is possible to have an idea of the different 
positions for and against vegetarianism, especially the philosophical ones 
which, as he explains at the beginning of his work, are his main focus: 
Many people have argued against abstinence from animate [foods], and […], 
among philosophers, the Peripatetics, the Stoics and the Epicureans have 
made most effort to oppose the philosophy of Pythagoras and Empedocles 
[…]. I shall set out their practical and general questions about the teaching, 
leaving aside those which specifically attack the arguments of Empedocles. 
(Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, I, 3, 3-4)
The arguments against vegetarianism, based mainly on the idea that only 
humans possess logos, indicate that this practice was perceived as a threat 
in the ancient world since it represented a break not only from the institu-
 6 See also Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, III, 24, 7: “It is no wonder 
that humans are so different from animals in ability to learn, quickness of thought and all 
that concerns justice and community. Many animals too surpass all human beings, some 
in size and swiftness, others in strength of sight and keenness of hearing, but this does not 
mean that humans are deaf or blind or powerless. We run too, even if more slowly than 
deer, and we see, even if worse than falcons, and nature has not deprived us of strength 
and size, even if we are nothing in comparison with elephants and camels”. 
 7 On this topic cf. Porphyry 1977, 9-41, and Porphyry 1979, 9-50, 138-51. 
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tions and customs of the time but also from the common mindset (Bouf-
fartigue and Patillon 1977, LXVIII).
Porphyry believes that, while it is legitimate to compare animals and 
humans, this is not the case for animals and plants: in fact: “it is the nature 
of animals to have perceptions, to feel distress, to be afraid, to be hurt, and 
therefore to be injured. Plants have no perceptions, so nothing is alien or 
bad to them, nothing is harm or injustice” (Porphyry, On Abstinence from 
Killing Animals, III, 19, 2). Therefore, killing an animal and eating its flesh 
is equivalent to murder, which can only contaminate both the body and the 
soul of the perpetrator. For the same reason, no animal can be an appropri-
ate sacrifice to the gods and anyone who thinks differently has an ignoble 
idea of the divine. 
This second point, based on the necessity of a religious reformation 
(because a true god cannot be satisfied with the wholly material cult deriv-
ing from animal sacrifice), even if primarily addressing the issue of sacrifice 
and not of meat-eating, is also clearly linked to a vegetarian stance.
These two points become central in Porphyry’s justification of veg-
etarianism. Thus, he reclaims some features of ancient vegetarianism: the 
necessity that the soul have supremacy over the body, that it weaken its link 
with it as much as possible, thus subduing its demands, and therefore that 
meat be excluded from the diet. Indeed, if meat-eating severely impairs 
the health of the body, being a heavy food that is difficult to digest, it also 
strongly contaminates the soul, increasingly binding it to materiality and 
thus compromising its effort to ascend to the divine.
It is not surprising then (in fact this seems to be an argument peculiar 
to him) that Porphyry clearly states that meat-eating introduces evil spirits 
and the souls of the killed animals into man (On Abstinence from Killing 
Animals, II, 43 and 47). Hence the truly philosophical person, being a 
priest of the intelligible god (On Abstinence from Killing Animals, II, 49), 
understands that “the best offering to the gods is a pure intellect and a soul 
unaffected by passion; it is also appropriate to make them moderate offer-
ings of other things, not casually but with full commitment” (Porphyry, 
On Abstinence from Killing Animals, II, 61, 1). After his broad discussion 
(based on Theophrastus) of the natural affinity of all living beings, Por-
phyry concludes Book III of his treatise by taking his thesis a step further: 
Someone who does not restrict harmlessness to human beings, but extends 
it also to the other animals, is more like the god, and if extension to plants 
is possible, he preserves the image even more […]. which is like the god has 
true riches by that very assimilation. No one who is rich and needs nothing 
commits injustice. (Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, III, 27, 2 
and 5)
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According to Porphyry, the idea that abstention from meat, especially if 
practiced collectively or by a spiritual elite, has even greater benefits for 
human communities is demonstrated by a series of historical examples 
(from Greece and other communities). If vegetarianism produced a general 
condition of health and peace, as well as great affinity to the gods, in archaic 
Greece (On Abstinence from Killing Animals, IV, 2), the same can be said 
about the lifestyle practiced by Egyptian priests, Jewish Essenes, Persian 
Magi and Indian Brahmans (On Abstinence from Killing Animals, IV, 6-18).
In the final part of his work, Porphyry recalls the model of the true 
philosopher dedicated to elevating himself to the divine and becoming 
similar to it. In so doing, he reaffirms the reason underlying his defense of 
vegetarianism, that is to contribute to that effort though abstention from 
foods considered contaminants (such as meat) and whose consumption is 
contrary to pietas, to justice and to wisdom: 
A man who engages in philosophy should prescribe for himself, as far as pos-
sible, the holy laws which have been determined by gods and by people who 
follow the gods. It is evident that the holy laws of peoples and cities impose 
purity on holy people and forbid them to eat animate food, and indeed prevent 
the masses from eating some kinds, whether from piety or because the food 
causes some harm. (Porphyry, On Abstinence from Killing Animals, IV, 18, 9)
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